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PRIOR APPROPRIATION: RULE, PRINCIPLE, OR RHETORIC?
A. DAN TARLOCK*

I.

INTRODUCTION: FIRST IN TIME, FIRST RIGHT-IS IT A
REAL RULE?

Prior in time, prior in right is the central dogma of western water
law.l With limited exceptions, western water rights are said to be allocated by the doctrine of prior appropriation. 2 The great issue has been
how, not why, exclusive, temporal rights can be obtained to a fixed
quantity of surface, and in more limited cases, ground water "[a]s
opposed to the correlative rights of the common law, whereby all
riparian owners on the stream have equal rights." 3
In all western states except Colorado, the answer is that states use an
administrative permit system to create and to enforce priorities. 4 Administrative agencies, originally the office of the state engineer, supervise and
police the acquisition, exercise and transfer of water rights, but administration has not altered adherence to priority. All water rights remain
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Hawaii School of Law, Spring 2001. A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965 Stanford University. I have long been
struck by how much priority talk there is in the West compared to the lack of reported water law cases
that actually enforce a priority. This article is not a systematic empirical study of the extent of priority
enforcement throughout the West, but over the last few years, I have pressed water lawyers,
administrators and academics for specific examples of priority enforcement. I would to thank Reed
Benson of Oregon Water Watch; Steven Clyde of Clyde, Snow, Sessions and Swenson, Salt Lake City;
Ramsey Knopf of Patrick & Stowell, P.C., Aspen, Colorado; Reed Marbut, Oregon Water Resources
Department; Joe Sax, House-Hurd Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley; John
Thorson, former Special Master in the Gila River Adjudication; Gary Weatherford of Weatherford &
Taaffe LLP, San Francisco; and others for providing some answers to my questions, but all opinions
and errors of fact and judgment remain mine.
1. See I SAMUEL WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 299, at 307 (3d ed. 1911).
2. The semi-arid states on both sides of the inner-mountain west first adopted the common law of
riparian rights and then switched to prior appropriation or dual appropriation-riparian systems in the
late 19th century to promote irrigation. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Riparian Rights in the West, 43
OKLA. L. REV. 51, 51-55 (1990). These "dual system" states recognized both appropriative and
riparian rights. See id. In almost all dual system states, riparian rights based on actual use have been
converted to appropriative rights and unused rights have been extinguished. Common law riparian
rights remain important in California, Oklahoma, and possibly Nebraska. California has creatively
converted unexercised riparian rights to low priority riparian rights, see In re Waters of Long Valley
Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 668 (Cal. 1979), but a subsequent case limited the rule to statutory
adjudications, see Pleasant Valley Canal Co. v. Borror, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 28-29 (1998). In contrast,
Oklahoma has bucked the west-wide trend and in 1990 revived unexercised riparian rights. See
Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990).
3. I WIEL, supra note I, § 279, at 291.
4. See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 245 (2d ed. 1991); Joseph L.
Sax, EnvironmentalLaw at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial Fragmentof Contemporary History,
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grounded in the mining and early irrigation practices that produced the
prior appropriation doctrine. Agencies exist primarily to make it work.
Under the law of prior appropriation, water rights are allocated to
the first person to put a specific quantity of water to beneficial use. 5 The
user obtains a temporal priority, and in times of scarcity, the right to
withdraw or pump water is curtailed in reverse order of the manifestation
of an intent to appropriate. The most junior user right holder must yield
to the more senior and so on along a stream system or, in theory in some
states, in a ground water basin. 6 There are minor exceptions. A senior
cannot make a call on a junior if the call would be futile, that is the water
would not in fact reach the senior's point of diversion. 7 However, this
exception seems to exist more in theory than in practice. The right is
good to the last drop. 8
Prospective enforcement of priorities dominates the legal and
political discourse of western water from small streams to the major
interstate rivers such as the Colorado, Rio Grande and the Missouri. 9
Water users rely on the possible enforcement of priorities in calculating
the security of their entitlements, and all drought and long-term shortage
projections are predicated on a worst case enforcement scenario. However, the enforcement of priorities assumes that adequate use and streamflow information exists and that there is a speedy curtailment process.
This is seldom the case. There is often a large gap between the amount
of water claimed and the amount of water actually put to beneficial use,
5. Most water law casebooks introduce the prior appropriation system through the doctrine of
"relation back." See, e.g., FRANKJ. TRELEASE, WATER LAW, CASES ANDMATERIALS 135 (1967). Prior
to the introduction of permit systems, an appropriator could post a notice of intent to divert, and the
priority would relate back to the date of the posting of the notice, provided that the appropriator
proceeded with due diligence to put the water to beneficial use. In permit states, the priority date is
the date of the filing of the permit application. See Sand Point Water & Light Co. v. Panhandle Dev.
Co., 83 P. 347, 350 (Idaho 1905). The frontier posting rules survive in Colorado's "first step" doctrine.
See, e.g., In re Applications for Water Rights, 838 P.2d 840, 849 (Colo. 1992).
6. See State ex rel. Bliss v. Dority, 225 P.2d 1007 (N.M. 1950) (holding that a statute subjecting
ground water to prior appropriation is not an unconstitutional taking).
7. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
8. In 1992, the Montana Supreme Court reaffirmed the right of irrigators to de-water a river by
taking two-thirds of a drought-stressed flow, over the objections of an environmental group. See
Baker Ditch Co. v. District Ct., 824 P.2d 260 (Mont. 1992). During a drought that began in 1987, the
Walker River Irrigation District in Nevada drained a 42,460 acre foot reservoir "flushing warm water
and considerable quantities of sediment from the reservoir, subsequently causing an extensive fish kill
downstream."
NEVADA DIVISION OF WATER PLANNING, WALKER RIVER CHRONOLOGY: PART
III-TWENrTM CENTURY, available at <http://www.state.nv.us/cnr/ndwp/walker/walker3.htm>.
9. Justice Hobbs of the Colorado Supreme Court has broadly characterized the modem purpose
of the beneficial use requirement as the advancement of "the fundamental principles of Colorado and
western water law that favor optimum use, efficient water management, and priority administration,
and disfavor speculation and waste." Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990
P.2d 46, 54 (Colo. 1999). For an excellent recent survey of the problems of limiting water users to
beneficial use, see Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919 (1998).
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and this makes enforcement difficult. To remedy this problem, western
states such as Arizona, Idaho, and Montana have invested millions of
dollars in general adjudications to quantify rights so that the system of
priorities can actually be fairly and accurately administered over a
century after large claims to water were filed.10
This article addresses the question of whether priority enforcement
is in fact the rule of western water law. It argues that priority is an
efficient rule of water allocation, but it is often more rhetoric than rule.
Like all drastic rules, the rule's importance lies more in the threat of its
application rather than the application."l
Priority's modern significance lies in the threat of enforcement
rather than the actual enforcement because it encourages water users to
cooperate either to reduce the risk of enforcement to as close to zero as
possible or to share more equitably the burdens of shortages. This said,
cooperation and ad hoc sharing do not come easily to water users.
Alternative allocation systems usually emerge only when a significant
group of water users thinks that cooperation will produce a superior
result to the likely legal resolution allocation of the resource. If there is
a credible threat of actual priority enforcement, users may cooperate to
avoid the short and long term costs of the result. The formation of the
Southern Nevada Water Authority to find regional solutions to
supplement Nevada's limited Colorado River priority and to allow Las
Vegas to continue its sprawl is an example of the incentives that
enforcement can provide.12
The fact that priority enforcement is more bluff than substance does
not undermine the need for consistent and fair allocation rules, but it
does call into question the sole reliance on enforcement of priorities to
allocate water in temporary and chronic shortages. The principal assumption of this article is that experience will demonstrate that priorities
are seldom enforced in practice. In many situations, the strict enforcement of prior appropriation would raise substantial fairness and efficiency concerns. Further, most water users are "repeat users" and thus they
have incentives to share rather than stand on their rights-at least if
Indian reserved water rights are not involved This is especially true on
larger rather than smaller streams, but the future costs of priority enforcement can be high on small streams as well. Thus, it is not surprising that
states have taken extraordinary steps to ensure that the rule is never
applied in practice and that federal, state and local water distribution
10.
11.
12.
(Paonia,

See SAX E' AL., supra note 4, at 271-79.
I am indebted to eminent California water lawyer Gary Weatherford for this point.
See, e.g., Jon Christensen, Las Vegas May Shoot Craps with its Water, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
Colo.), June 23, 1997, available at <http://www.hcn.org>.
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agencies find alternative ways to ameliorate the rule when droughts
occur.
I do not argue that priority should be abandoned. There are no
superior alternatives. Rather, I make a positive and normative argument.
The positive one is simply that priority enforcement is generally the
exception rather than the norm, and thus there is a need to examine
more systematically what happens when scarcity occurs and how large
and small systems cope. The normative argument is that the focus of
water allocation should be on the actual expectations that lie behind a
use, 13 rather than the simple enforcement of the entitlement to understand that alternative ways of satisfying those expectations exist. 14 The
core idea of prior appropriation is the protection of investment-backed
expectations from the risks of variable water years and perhaps now
global climate change, and this idea remains a valid objective. The issue
is whether the enforcement of priorities contributes to this objective.
There are legitimate alternative risk allocation mechanisms to prior
appropriation and it is important to consider them as the West increasingly must accommodate four major competing interests, large and growing cities, traditional consumptive and non-consumptive users, Native
American claims, and the restoration of degraded aquatic ecosystems
and the maintenance of healthy ones. Property rights, in contrast to
contracts, are not conventionally defined as risk allocation mechanisms
13. This analysis echoes and recasts the Progressive Era concern that the monopolization of
water rights would prevent the more widespread distribution of access to water to the detriment of
society's interest in the conservation of resources. For example, the great treatise writer Samuel Wiel,
floated the idea that unreasonable assertions of priority would not be recognized. See WIEL, supra
note 1, § 310, at 329-40. The leading case rejecting priority enforcement is State ex rel. Cary v.
Cochran, 292 N.W. 239 (Neb. 1940). The case enforced a priority which involved a 77% loss
between the point of diversion and point of withdrawal:
Amici curiae urge that the doctrine of reasonable use is in force in this state and that it
should be applied to the case at bar. We recognize the principle that the public has an
interest in the public waters of the state and it is the use thereof only that may be appropriated. Even though an adjudicated appropriation may be vested, it may be subjected to
regulation and control by the state by virtue of its police power. It may likewise be
circumscribed to the extent that a limited diversion for a specified purpose will not permit
of an undue interference with the rights of other appropriators on the stream. But we
cannot agree that the doctrine of reasonable use can be applied in a case where delivery
of a usable quantity of water can be made, although the losses suffered in so doing are
great. To permit the officers of the state the right to say whether prospective losses
would or would not justify the delivery of usable quantities of water would clothe such
officers with a discretion incompatible with the vested interests of the relators, and
destroy the very purpose of the doctrine of appropriation existent in this state.
Id. at 247.
14. The United States Department of Interior's no surprises policy, which shifts the major risk of
unanticipated conservation measures unnecessary to maintain the integrity of habitat conservation
plans, is an example of defining the core entitlement-developer ability to adapt to changed conditions
and implement a mutually advantageous risk sharing arrangement. See generally Fred P. Bosselman,
The Statutory and ConstitutionalMandatefor a No SurprisesPolicy, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707 (1997).
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because the law of property seeks to eliminate all risk that there will be
an interference with complete enjoyment, such as an unconsented
entry.1 5 However, water rights are as much about risk as they are about
stability. Because risk is inherent in water entitlements, there are no
inherent legal barriers to management solutions that equitably reassign
the risks of water shortages to accommodate all relevant uses and
16
stakeholders in a basin.
II.

FIRST IN TIME, FIRST IN RIGHT: SOCIAL CONSTRUCT OR
SOCIO-BIOLOGY
A.

WHY PRIORITY: THE EXPECTATION ANSWER

First in time, first in right is a foundational principle of property law
and has many powerful justifications. The principle that prior possession is the root of all titles is fundamental to the assignment of real and
personal property in the Anglo American system of property rights.17
Priority enjoys both powerful, but not compelling historical, economic,
and moral justifications, as well as intuitive common sense ones. 18 Proponents of strong private property regimes argue that the drive to acquire is a universal rule grounded in human nature. 19 One need not be
this biologically deterministic to accept the law of prior appropriation.
The protection of expectation remains the best justification for priority.
15. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules,
106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2096-97 (1997).
16. The California Supreme Court sanctioned a new risk-based law of flood control liability in
Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water District, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89 (1997). Bunch holds that a public entity,
which diverts water from a natural watercourse that has historically flooded adjacent lands and
constructs flood control works that fail in a major rain event, is only liable if it acted unreasonably in
designing, constructing and operating the project. "[T]he only way to determine whether a damaged
private landowner has . . . been forced to contribute a compensable 'disproportionate' share of the
public undertaking is to determine whether the system, as designed, constructed, operated, and
maintained exposed him to an 'unreasonable' risk of harm, either individually or in relation to other
landowners." Id. at 100-01.
17. The law of property generally only departs from priority when justice demands it. For
example, in the law of mortgages, the failure of the first mortgagee to record may set up a circular
priority problem when a second mortgagee, with notice of the first, records and then a third mortgagee
with no notice of the first two transactions records. A few states apply the common law rule of first in
time, but most subordinate the first mortgagee to the second and third lien holders because the first was
at fault and caused the problem by failing to record. See GEORGE E. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 366-74 (2d
ed. 1970).
18. As Richard Epstein has demonstrated, rules which allocate resources to the first possession
have a strong practical, intuitive appeal but have no a priori moral justification. For example, the labor
theory justification for the rule, which posits that ownership is based on reduction of something in the
negative community to possession, is both circular and incomplete. See generally Richard A. Epstein,
Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979).
19. The distinguished conservative Russian scholar, Richard Pipes, argues that "acquisitiveness is
universal among humans as well as animals, that it involves much more than the desire to control
physical objects, being intimately connected to human personality by promoting a sense of identity and
competence .... " RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 65 (1999).
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In The Path of the Common Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes justified
adverse possession with his famous cultural insight that:
[i]t is in the nature of man's mind. A thing which
you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long
time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in
your being and cannot be torn away without your
resenting the act and trying to defend yourself,
however you came by it"20
Water rights users, who have in fact put water to a beneficial use, are
said to need clear, consistent rules that do not invite challenges to
claimed entitlements in times of scarcity. Priority protects their legitimate-backed expectations, 2 1 at least in theory. As the late Charles J.
Meyers succinctly advised the National Water Commission, the prior
appropriation system "promotes investment by giving security of
use." 22 This expectation can also be recast in quasi-religious terms. To
the western irrigation community, prior appropriation represents a sacred
and eternal covenant between the federal government and settlers. It is
the reward for enduring the risks and hardships of settling the harsh, arid
West and thus the right to use water is eternal and God-given.
B.

THE COMMONS MANAGEMENT ANSWER
Modern commons management theory 2 3 can also be invoked to
support priority, but it equally exposes the limits of the rule. Priority
works very well as a rule for the initial assignment of exclusive property
rights. Water allocation regimes are most accurately characterized as
20. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Common Law, 10HARV. L. REV. 477 (1897). Recent
behavioral law and economics scholarship has recast this insight as the endowment effect. Modem
endowment effect theory posits that people value property rights that they "own" and are protected
against involuntary alienation more than less firm entitlements to "mere" compensation. See Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541,
1551 (1998); Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future of BehavioralEconomic Analysis of Law, 51 VA,D.
L. REV. 1765, 1777 (1998).
21. The Supreme Court has stated that whether or not a land use regulation interferes with
investment-backed expectations is one of the relevant factors to determine if a taking of property has
occurred. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See generally
Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Takings Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215 (1995).
22. Charles J. Meyers, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE A PPROPRIATION SYSTEM 6
(National Water Commission, Legal Study No. 5, 1991). RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF
LIBERTY, JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 83, 155 (1998), offers a similar but theoretically richer

justification. First-possession is justified because it allows persons to act on their own resource use
preferences and it creates incentives for each user to pursue his or her own interest in the situation
where a person has invested resources in determining that a claim is not inconsistent with another
claim.
23. In brief, commons management theory refers to the debate among lawyers, economists,
policital scientists, and others on the optimum institutional mix-formal private property rights,
customary practice and public regulation-to allocate the right to use common property resources
readily accessible by large groups of users.
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common property management and risk allocation regimes. In any
water allocation regime, there are two tragedies of the commons. 2 4 First,
unrestrained access will ultimately deprive similarly situated users of
their fair share of the resource. 25 Second, such access will Cause long
term environmental degradation. Prior appropriation solves the first
tragedy; priority, along with anti-waste and anti-speculative rules, limits
individual use and produces a relatively broad and stable distribution of
water use opportunities. The resource is fairly allocated over the long
term among consumptive users. Prior appropriation does not solve the
tragedy of environmental degradation; 26 to the contrary, it is one of the
primary causes. One of the major challenge of modern water law is to
find ways to promote aquatic restoration in a legal regime that promotes
and entrenches environmentally destructive diversions. 27 For example,
leading aquatic ecologists have called for the establishment of normative
flow regimes 2 8 to restore degraded rivers. 2 9
Commons management theory is not a complete justification for
prior appropriation because it teaches that there are powerful incentives
for users to depart from it in crunch times. One of its major lessons is
that users within a common property regime have incentives to cooperate
among themselves to share access and use equitably. 3 0 In her pathbreaking study of commons management, Elinor Ostrum describes an
allocation regime in Valencia, Spain based, as economists have urged, on
equal access and on comparative crop efficiency in times of shortage:
The basic elements of the turno system are that (1) the order in
which irrigators receive water is fixed, and (2) each farmer can
decide how much water to take as long as water is not wasted.
24. The tragedy of the commons refers to the theory, popularized by Garret Hardin's classic
article, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), which posits that unrestrained access
to common property resources will lead to over use and degradation, and thus access needs to be
restrained by property rules or centralized management. The literature on commons theory is summarized in ELINOR OSTRUM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION 1-8 (1990).
25. See Hardin, supra note 24.
26. Professor Carol M. Rose has developed this point in Expanding the Choices for the Global
Commons: Comparing Newfangled TradableAllowance Schemes to Old-FashionedCommon Property
Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 45 (1999). The paper compares common property
management regimes with tradable pollution permits and observes that local common property
management schemes work best to permit sustainable resource exploitation, such as irrigation, but do
not work as well as tradable permits to limit access to promote environmental values.
27. See generally Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting Established Water
Uses in the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of PriorAppropriation,28 ENVTL. L. 881 (1998).
28. Normative flow regimes are artificial regimes that approximate to some degree the natural
hydrograph.
29. See, e.g., N. Leroy Poff et al., The NaturalFlow Regime: A Paradigmfor River Conservation
and Restoration,BIOSCIENCE, Dec. 1997, at 469.
30. See Elinor Ostrum et al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, 284
SCIENCE 278, 279 (Apr. 9, 1999).
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Consequently, no irrigator can tell exactly when his turn will
come, because that depends on the volume of water in the canal
and the quantity needed by those ahead of him. On the other
hand, each irrigator knows that he can take as much water as he
needs when his turn eventually comes.
In periods of extraordinary drought, these procedures are
modified so that farms whose crops are in the most need of
water are given priority over farms whose crops require less
water. At the beginning of a drought period, the farmers themselves are expected to apply water only to those crops in most
need to shorten their turns in order to allow other farmers in
need to obtain the scarce water. As a drought period continues,
the syndic and his representatives take more and more responsibility for determining how long each farmer may have water, in
light of the condition of the farmer's crops and the needs of
others. In recent years, procedures to be used in extraordinary
drought have been needed less frequently than in earlier times,
because of the increased regulatory capacity of the Generalisimo Dam. Even so, an established procedure is in place for
switching rule regimes when environmental conditions
change. 3 1
As this case study illustrates, the certainty and investment-backed
expectation justifications for priority do not, therefore, compel or justify
the consistent, rigorous enforcement of priorities. Priority is an intuitive
but not inevitable allocation rule.
This commons example is not an argument for the wholesale abandonment of priority and its replacement by ad hoc allocation based on
allocative efficiency or justice. The alternatives to priority are not appealing. There is little ethical or empirical basis for a rule that subsequent in
time is prior in right. 32 Nor is there a strong case for a system that
permits ad hoc case by case equity or efficiency adjudications in times
of shortage. The limited experience with eastern permit systems, which
allow an administrator the discretion to displace existing permits or to
refuse to grant new ones, suggests that most states will follow a de facto
priority system. 3 3 The most plausible alternatives are rules of equal
31. See OSTROM, supra note 24, at 69-73.
32. The sociologist Irving Goffman could only come with being last in line for the guillotine. See
IRVING GoFFmAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC (1971).

33. A Florida intermediate appellate court held that existing permit holders enjoy "superiority"
over new applicants and reduced a new agricultural user's application to protect the pressure of an
existing municipal well field. See Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 575 So. 2d 1324, 1328 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991).
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distribution or public ownership and distribution. 34 The first is perhaps
the rule of riparian rights, and has been rejected in both the Far West and
increasingly in the humid east because any fairness benefits are outweighed by the extreme uncertainty of the rule. As Jacob Beuscher
demonstrated years ago, 35 a close study of riparian rights cases reveals
that courts generally find that the prior use is the reasonable use. The
late Frank J. Trelease managed, over vigorous objection, to make priority
36
an element in the Restatement of Torts (Second) test of reasonableness.
The Restatement of Torts (Second) makes "the protection of existing
values of water uses, land, investments and enterprises" one of the nine
37
relevant factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of a use.
C.

PRIOR APPROPRIATION: CUSTOM OR RULE

Custom is an important element in prior appropriation because its
customary origins and subsequent evolution explain a great deal about
the gap between rhetoric and reality. Common law historians continue
to debate the basis of the common law, 38 but the standard theory is that
the common law represents formalized custom. Because the early courts
endorsed the miners and irrigators customs, the debates about the nature
of the common law and the nature of law has special force in water law.
Local custom plays a very limited role in the abstract and universal
modern common law, 39 although in recent years, there has been renewed
attention of the question of whether law or norms of "nested" common
interest communities control behavior. Water allocation regimes would
seem to be prime candidates for systems where norms trump legal rules,
and there is considerable evidence in comparative irrigation studies for
this thesis. 4 0 Many of these studies involve irrigation regimes. For
example, Professor Elinor Ostrom's common pool management scholarship has shown that irrigation regimes develop effective sharing rules
34. This is the premise of THE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE, WATER LAW
COMMITTEE, WATER RESOURCES PLANNING & MANAGEMENT DIVISION, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL
(1997), § IR-I-05x provides: "The State, in the exercise of its sovereign police power to
protect the public interest in the waters of the State, undertakes to provide, through this Code, an
orderly strategy to allocate available water efficiently and equitably in times of water shortage or
water emergency."
ENGINEERS

35. See J.H. Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Elements in RiparianDoctrine States, 10BuFF.

L. REV. 448, 451-52 (1961).
36. Dean Trelease's efforts to bring order to the common law of riparians continues to be
unjustly criticized as unsuited to the humid east. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 601(c) (Robert E.
Beck ed., 1991).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979).
38. See, e.g., J.W. TUBBS, THE COMMON LAW MIND: MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN C ONCEPTIONS

24-32 (2000).
39. See David L. Callies, Custom and Public Trust: Background Principles of State Property
Law?, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003 (2000).
40. See text accompanying supra notes 30-31.
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and dispute resolution procedures. 4 1 Professor Robert Ellickson's study
of cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California argues that small communities of common property users often follow conduct norms which
are different from the formal rules, 4 2 and his work has influenced a
number of "norms" scholars. 4 3 However, ultimately western irrigation
regimes are rule rather than customary or social norm regimes. States
and local water user communities have invested substantial resources to
administer legal priorities. Put differently, strict adherence to the law of
prior appropriation is the custom.
Western water law is said to have evolved from mining customs in
California, but it has long since hardened into a regime of rules. Western
water rights were initially a practical, intuitive response to the seasonable
unreliability of western stream flows. They were perceived as fair for the
time, but competing claims to water have changed dramatically since the
settlement of the West as a mining, cattle, and then irrigation economy.4
In frontier times, when the institutions of justice were limited, simple
rules were necessary to bring order to the chaotic early mining and
irrigation communities.4 5 Unrestrained grabbing, rather than conformity
to a settled property rights regime, were the norm. 46 Miners developed
the custom of allocating rights by priority rather than trying to use the
47
vague equal sharing rules of the common law of riparian rights.
Courts sanctioned this custom as an acceptable risk distribution scheme
for the frontier, and later this custom was deemed the only property
rights regime suitable to the arid West. 48 As the great Samuel Wiel noted,
"[t]his Possessory System whereby lands, mines and waters were claimed
by 'prior appropriation' had all the force of a system of law governing
real estate all over the West, for there was no other land law of
49
consequence upon the public domain, and it was all public domain."
41. See OSTRUM, supra note 24, at 69-88.
42. See Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986).
43. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997) (citing Robert C. Ellickson, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETrLE

DISPtrrES 40-81 (1991)).
44. See Dellapenna, supra note 2, at 53.
45. See ROBERT DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS 59-62 (1983).

46. See id.
47. See 1 WIEL, supra note 1, § 71, at 72.
48. For example, at a time when the public use doctrine limited the exercise of the power of
eminent domain to property which would be used by the public, the Supreme Court upheld a Utah
statute which allowed appropriators to condemn ditch right-of-ways across private lands because of
"some peculiar condition of the soil or climate, or other peculiarity of the State." Clark v. Nash, 198
U.S. 361, 368 (1905).
49. 1 WIEL, supra note 1, § 84, at 89.
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Custom is a powerful but ultimately limited foundation for western
water law. Custom reflects a static rather than dynamic system. The
primary modem importance of custom, other than as a historical explanation for the doctrine, of prior appropriation is that it is the basis for the
claim that appropriative rights represent a Lockian, pre-political appropriation of "nature," 50 and are thus constitutionally protected from any
modification. The twentieth century reality, of course, is quite different.
Water rights were only pre-political because no effective legal regime
existed, and the "state of nature" was eventually replaced with a full
civil society. Western water allocation policies and the rights that support
them are the result of deliberate political choices about the distribution
of the risks of shortages.51 Dean Frank J. Trelease participated in an
early National Academy of Sciences global climate change study and
described prior appropriation as a fair and efficient risk distribution
scheme for a regime of many small-scale irrigators. "The rule of
priority does guarantee a firm supply to all for whom the source is
sufficient, and the senior irrigators can build a stable agriculture unmatched in humid climes."

52

However, the rhetoric of western water law

has obscured the risks inherent in prior appropriation and has stressed
the illusory firmness of water rights as we have moved to more
sophisticated allocation regimes where security is as much physical as it
is legal.
The legacy of reliance on priority makes formal modification
difficult because the rule is the norm and has some, if undetermined,
constitutional status. 53 The importance of rules is illustrated by a recent
case which limited the power of the federal government to administer a
Reclamation project a variance with priorities. 54 The court held that the
50. For a recent summary of the debate over whether property is bottom-up or top-down see
Carol M. Rose, What Government Can Do For Property (And Vice Versa), in THE FUNDAMENTAL
INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY 209 (Nicholas Mercuro & Warren J.
Samuels eds., 1999).
51. The debate in water policy is whether the allocation of western water produced by state and
federal policies is democratic or tyrannical. Compare DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER,
ARIDrrY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1985) (endorsing the Wittfogel thesis that control
of water leads to state tyranny), with NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND
WATER, 1770s-1990s (1992), DONALD J. PISANI, To RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: WATER, LAW, AND
PUBLIC POLICY, 1848-1902 (1992), and ROBERT KELLEY SCHNEIDERS, UNRULY RIVER: Two CENTURIES OF
CHANGE ALONG THE MISSOURI 253-54 (1999) (arguing that western water allocation is the product of
multi-state interest pressure on a sometimes reluctant federal government).
52. Frank J. Trelease, Climatic Change and Water Law, in CLIMATE, CLIMATIC CHANGE, AND
WATER SUPPLY 70 (Wallis ed., 1977).
53. The more limited constitutional protection of water compared to land rights is articulated in
Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution,Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257
(1990) and Joseph L. Sax, Rights That "Inhere in the Title Itself": The Impact of the Lucas Case on
Western Water Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943 (1993).
54. See Goshen Irrigation Dist. v. Pathfinder Irrigation Dist., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1251 (D. Wyo.
1999).
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parties may consent to a suspension of priorities in a drought year, but
consent to an emergency allocation cannot waive strict enforcement of
55
priorities in the future. The court concluded that the Warren Act,
which allows the sale of surplus water from Bureau of Reclamation
reservoirs, precluded the Bureau of Reclamation from making a pro rata
distribution between prior right holders and Warren Act contractors
different from that spelled out in a Bureau-District contract. 5 6 Prior to
any yearly allocation, the Bureau had obtained the consent of all
irrigations districts since 1941.57 But, the court held that such consent
did not waive the right to demand the strict enforcement of priorities.
Waiver "would put an immediate end to any possibility of beneficial and
58
necessary short-term agreements in the area of water rights."
D.

CHANGED CONDITIONS: WHY PRIORITY IS LESS IMPORTANT TODAY

The modem problems with priority stem from the changes in the
West that have occurred since the late 19th century. As previously
mentioned, prior appropriation was originally devised to bring order to a
frontier economy. 5 9 Prior appropriation was constructed to support
local individual and cooperative irrigated agriculture. Priority provided
both a way of allocating highly variable natural flows and of stimulating
60
investment in relatively small-scale canals and diversion structures.
Appropriative water rights were a simple and fair risk allocation regime
among similarly situated competing claimants. However, conditions
have changed substantially since the second half of the 19th century, and
the result is that priority is less important today. The world of small
water users continues to exist, especially in Colorado, Wyoming, and
Utah, but it has long ceased to exist or it is fading throughout much the
West.
The first major change was the Reclamation era, which lasted roughly from 1890 to the mid-1970s. Initially, the goal of the era was to settle
the West with family farms. 6 1 To this end, support for irrigated agriculture became a national priority. The Reclamation program was premised
on the provision of wide margins of safety for recurring periods of
55. Ch. 141, 36 Stat. 625 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 523-525 (1994)).
56. See Goshen, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 1251; see also City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5
P.3d 853, 870 (Cal. 2000) (finding that a court cannot impose physical solution on dissenting water
right holders).
57. See Goshen, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 1257. However, because the Bureau did not obtain consent to
allocation in 1989, the Goshen Irrigation District brought suit against the Pathfinder Irrigation District.
58. Id.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
60. See DUNBAR, supra note 45, at 18-35.
61. See SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 655.
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drought and highly variable rainfall patterns through the construction of
carry-over storage facilities. 6 2 In the nineteenth and first half of the
twentieth century, large carry-over facilities were constructed in all western states to firm up western water rights. These facilities substantially
reduced but did not eliminate the risks of shortages, and the switch from
a direct diversion to storage water allocation system has had a profound
impact on the doctrine of prior appropriation. 6 3 The federal reclamation
program's construction of carry-over storage reservoirs to back-stop
water rights, not the law, is the main reason that water rights are relatively
firm regardless of the water year. It is the very alternation of the western
landscape by dams and canals that provides a modem basis to use new
management strategies to overlay a new hydrologic regime on existing
legal regimes with minimal disruption.
The Reclamation program gradually morphed into a regional
development program after the Bureau of Reclamation's great rival, the
United States Army Corps of Engineers, reluctantly embraced multiplepurpose river basin development. 64 During the New Deal, the Reclamation Program, along with the United States Army Corps of Engineers
mission, was transformed from supporting small farms to regional multipurpose development and the support of large farming units. 65 Larger
and larger dams were constructed, and flood control and hydroelectric
power generation became as, or more important than, irrigation. 6 6
Regions were given additional back-up storage, and some, such as the
Upper Missouri River states, received more back-up storage than they
could ever put to beneficial use. 67 The infamous Pick-Sloan Program on
the Missouri River turned the magnificent and unruly Missouri River
into a series of cold and biologically less diverse lakes to the benefit of
downstream navigation and flood control and to the detriment of
upstream irrigation, Indian entitlements, and regional development. 6 8
Reclamation and multiple-use required development diminished the
practical importance of priority in many areas of the West, and prior
appropriation has been further undermined by the end of the Reclama62. See MARC R EISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER
108-15 (1986).
63. See MARK FIEGE, IRRIGATED EDEN: THE MAKING OF THE AN AGRICULTURAL LANDSCAPE IN THE
AMERICAN WEST 112-16 (1999), for an account of how the damming of the Snake River-in the name
of prior appropriation-undermined the usefulness of priority as an allocation rule.
64. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 1890-1920, at 199-218 (1959).
65. See REISNER, supra note 62, at 151-75.
66. See id.
67. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Missouri River: The Paradoxof Conflict Without Scarcity, 2 GREAT
PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1997).
68. See JOHN THORSON, RIVER OF PROMISE, RIVER OF PERIL: THE POLITICS OF MANAGING THE
MISSOURI RIVER 76-85 (1994).
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tion Era and the transition to an era of reallocation and environmental
management. In 1985, the distinguished western resources scholar,
Charles Wilkinson, published an article that challenged the view that the
classic prior appropriation system was an adequate solution to the
emerging demands for the more efficient use of water, instream uses and
justice for Native American tribes. 69 Six years later, he prematurely
pronounced the system dead after EPA's veto of Denver's Twin Forks
storage reservoir. 7 0 The system is not dead. Rather the question is its
continuing relevance. Traditional western water allocation practice
resembles the pre-World War I Maginot Line, which the French build to
prevent a repeat of the 1870 Prussian attack. Prior appropriation
continues to avoid its application and to create incentives to structure
water allocation debates, but it is less and less likely to turn spigots off
and on. It is perhaps more accurate to describe prior appropriation as an
extreme default rule of decreasing marginal importance.
Several specific features of the post-Reclamation Era undermine the
relevance of priority. First, federal environmental laws create de facto
regulatory property rights that trump state-created rights. One of the
major developments in modern western water has been the effort to
protect fish habitats in large and small western rivers. 7 1 The Endangered
Species Act gives the federal government the power to curtail
state-created water rights in order to protect listed species. 7 2 This power,
not surprisingly, has been used sparingly. 73 Head gates have been closed
in some places such as the Sacramento River in California and the
Methow Valley in Washington state. However, the reason is usually the
lack of adequate fish screens rather than the diversion of water per se. 74
The second feature is that the specter of the exercise of these rights
is creating incentives for new basin management strategies that accommodate all major stakeholder users. 75 One of these strategies, the increas69. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317 (1985).
70. See Charles F. Wilkinson, PriorAppropriation 1848-1991, 21 ENVTL. L., at v (1991). For a
vitriolic rejoinder, see Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. (now Justice Hobbs), EcologicalIntegrity, New Western
Myth: A Critique of the Long's Peak Report, 24 ENVTL. L. 157 (1994).
71.

See REPORT OF THE W ESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW A DVISORY C OMMISSION, WATER IN THE

WEST: CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 3-51, 3-52 (1998).
72. See United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
73. See Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 191 F.3d 1115, 1122 (giving an
example where the Bureau of Reclamation, as the owner and manager of a dam, had a duty to comply
with the ESA), amended and superceded by 204 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 1999), and cert. denied sub. nom.
Klamath Drainage Dist. v. Peterson, 121 S. Ct. 44 (2000). See generally James R. Rasband,
Augmenting Stream Flows: How Useful are Sections 9 and 7 of the EndangeredSpecies Act?, 7 RIVERS
49 (1999).
74. See ABA Section on Environment, Energy and Resources, WATER LAW NEWSLETrER (Rocky

Mtn. Min. Law Found.), Jan. 2000, at 14.
75. See SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 555-56, for a discussion of the California Bay Delta
stakeholder process.
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ing use of water markets and water banks, is being used to correct the
rigidities of prior appropriation. 7 6 Transfers are perfectly consistent with
priority because the old priority date follows the new use. However,
transfers usually combine small rights into larger blocks of water. And,
the larger the block of water, the less amendable it is to be allocated by
priority because priority will seldom be invoked.
Third, prior appropriation is a rule for small irrigation communities,
but these are shrinking. 7 7 Prior appropriation continues to display
vitality in small, direct flow irrigation communities, but these are increasingly remnant communities of a former West. However, today
urban interests increasingly control the water policy agenda as the dominant players. Agriculture has historically claimed the largest share of the
region's developed supplies. Irrigated agriculture still commands close
to eighty percent of the West's water supplies, 78 but demand will slowly
shrink in the future. The stabilization of decline of western agriculture is
part of the larger pattern of the declining importance of raw commodity
production in the Western economy as the West continues to urbanize at
a rapid rate and to transform itself in a vibrant high tech service
economy.
A recent National Academy of Sciences report concisely stated the
relative position of irrigated agriculture concisely: "The value of water
in agriculture is generally less than in industrial or municipal uses . . .
[and] [b]ecause it is so expensive to develop additional water supplies,
only the higher-value water uses are likely to be justified economically." 79 "As late as 1940, almost half the West's people were directly
employed in farming, ranching, mining, and processing of agricultural
and mineral products."80 By 1969, however, all the natural resources
industries together provided only 11 percent of direct employment and
9.6 percent of personal income for residents of the Rocky Mountain
states. 8 1 The decline is continuing; in 1991 these combined industries
supported less than 6 percent of the region's employment and less than
5 percent of all personal income. 82 Agriculture has declined in terms of
76. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST; EFFICIENCY EQUrrY AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (1992).
77. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A NEW ERA FOR IRRIGATION 94 (1996).
78. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ESTIMATED WATER USE IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1995, at 32
(1998).
79. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A NEW ERA FOR IRRIGATION 67 (1996).
80. Pamela Case & Gregory Alward, Patternsof Demographic, Economic and Value Change in
the Western United States, REPORT TO THE WESTERN WATER POLICY ADVISORY REVIEW COMMISSION 1
(1997).
81. See Raymond Rasker, A New Look at Old Vistas: The Economic Role of Environmental
Quality in Western Public Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 369, 377 (1994).
82. See id.
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its proportional size of overall economic activity in the West, from ninth
in the list of income sources in 1977 to eleventh in 1993.83 Although
largely due to the Central Valley of California, the western states
84
continue to play an important role in national agricultural production.
The most important water-related conclusion that can be drawn
from the many recent studies of the rapid growth in most of the West is
that the growth patterns are relatively less dependent on the traditional
patterns of water use and development, because the West's population
growth is not accompanied by a proportional rise in total water
demand.8 5 Urban water use is more efficient compared to agricultural
uses.
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF PRIORITY
Prior appropriation is a law of rules, but the question remains: Are
the rules actually applied or invoked? This section of the article examines the primary limitations of the enforcement of priorities. The basic
argument is that there are many modern physical and behavioral constraints on the rigorous enforcement of priorities. The following is a
partial list of constraints and situations where priority is unlikely to work
well consistently or to work at all. In previous articles, I have addressed
the impact of global climate scenarios on prior appropriation.8 6 I note
only that the West faces possible increased water shortages as a result of
early spring evaporation caused by global warming. 87 Drier, more
water-short summers will only increase stresses to depart from prior
appropriation. 88
83. See Case & Alward, supra note 80, at 11, 13.
84. Federal policy towards agriculture has changed in recent years, as evidenced by the Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7334, (also known as the 1996
Farm Bill). This legislation removed the link between income support payments and farm prices by
providing for seven annually fixed but declining "production flexibility contract payments," whereby
participating farmers may receive government payments independent of current farm production and
prices. Farmers will have much greater flexibility to make planting decisions with the elimination of
annual acreage idling programs.. They will be able to plant any crop on contract acres, with limitations
on fruits and vegetables. As a result, farmers will rely more heavily on the market as a guide for
production decisions, and will bear greater income risk because payments are fixed and are not
related to market prices.
85. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western
Water Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 163, 168
(1999).
86. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, Western Water Law, Global Warming, and Growth Limitations,
24 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 979 (1991).
87. See A. Dan Tarlock, Now, Think Again About Adaptation, 9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 169,
175 (1992) (citing Jennifer Woodward, Turning Down the Heat: What the UnitedStates Laws Can do
to Help Ease Global Warming, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 203, 213-17 (1989)).
88. See id.
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CORRELATIVE NATURE OF WATER RIGHTS

Appropriative rights have been described as exclusive in contrast
with riparian rights, but they are in fact inherently correlative, and this
creates pressures on users to share with their neighbors. Even the most
selfish user is forced to take into account the interests of other users. All
water rights are usufructuary; they are rights to the use of water and do
not confer ownership of a stream or aquifer. All usufructuary rights in
fugitive resources are to some degree correlative because there are
inherent limitations on exclusivity. The oft invoked, but seldom applied,
futile call rule, which allows a junior to refuse a senior call if water will
not in fact reach the later point of diversion, 89 is an example of inherent
limitations.
There are two primary limitations that flow from the correlative
nature of water rights. First, all stream users have strong, if unequal
expectation, of the continued enjoyment of a right which cuts against
unlimited recognition of priority. The physical nature of water rights
creates strong pressures for equitable, sharing rules. The most striking
example of this pressure is the rule that senior right holders cannot
injure junior downstream right holders, who use the return flow, when
water rights are transferred. 9 0 More generally, water rights exist within a
community of users who can tolerate equitable adjustments, and thus the
case for a narrow, fixed rule is less compelling than has traditionally
been assumed. 9 1
Scattered empirical evidence confirms this assertion. Watermasters
who report to the Oregon Water Resources Department of Water Resources regulated 265 streams in 1998 and reported 7,663 regulatory
actions. 9 2 However, only six violation notices were sent to users, eight
formal enforcement orders were issued and no cases were referred to
Salem for formal enforcement. The Department offers two reasons for
this. First, there is a 98 percent voluntary compliance rate in the state
89. See State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 292 N.W. 239, 247 (Neb. 1940). The court in Cochran
refused to apply the futile call rule or the doctrine of reasonable use to modify the priority schedule on
the Platte River even though 700 second-feet of water had to remain in the stream to satisfy a
downstream senior right with a 162 second-foot entitlement.
90. See, e.g., Sante Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 57 (Colo.
1999).
91. This argument is developed at length in Carol M. Rose, Crystalsand Mud in Property Law, 40
STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). She points out that fixed rules, crystals, are more appropriate to dealings
with strangers than within a community of similarly situated entitlement holders. However, she also
notes that the fixed rules promote needed community stability, and thus, in a geologically inapt
metaphor, that in the end "crystals and mud dissolve into each other." Id. at 610.
92. See Internal Report on 1998 Field Regulation and Enforcement, Memorandum from Barry
Norris, Administrator Field and Technical Services, to Water Resources Commission 5 (Apr. 30,
1999).
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which is achieved "not without a substantial investment of time by field
regulatory staff."9 3 Second, watermasters spend a lot of time during
regulation negotiating voluntary reductions, rotations or compliance
schedules with water users. Often senior right holders volunteer to use
less than their entitlement so that junior users are not completely shut
off.
The second, and related "correlative" limitation is that prior
appropriation is not self-enforcing and the costs of enforcing prior
rights are high.9 4 The costs include individual user ill-will and possible
net efficiency losses as well as high transaction costs. The great Samuel
Wiel did not think that priority would survive in the face of the
conservation movement. 9 5 He argued that priorities should not be
enforced when it would be unreasonable to do so, as against other users
on the same stream. He quoted Justice Stephen J. Field's dictum in
Basey v. Gallagher9 6 that all appropriations must be used reasonably and
with "reference to the general condition of the country and the
necessities of the people, and not so as to deprive a whole neighborhood
or community of its use and to vest an absolute monopoly in a single
individual." 9 7 The beneficial use requirement works as a weak restraint
on priorities, but it remains too tied to the lowest common denominator
standard to play a major role in water allocation.
Wiel's prophecy has not been formally incorporated into the
western water law, 9 8 but there is an element of reasonableness in the
exercise of prior appropriation. A prior right holder can upset the
reasonable but legally unjustified expectations of other, junior users that
there will be de facto restraint and sharing in times of shortage and claim
a full entitlement, the long run costs may outweigh the short term
93. Id. at 4.
94. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 136-37 (1998).
95. See Samuel C. Wiel, "Priority" in Western Water Law, 18 YALE L.J. 189 (1908).
96. 87 U.S. 670 (1874).
97. 1 WIEL, supra note 1, at 333 (quoting Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670 (1874)). The strongest
support for Wiel's position is Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 224 U.S. 107 (1912), a case
decided after the last edition of this treatise was published. Schodde held that appropriator could not
claim natural flow of Snake River to lift water to irrigate land with water wheels. Field and Wiel's
efforts to balance the recognition of exclusive individual property rights with the obligation to exercise
the right reasonable in light of the competing of other users reflects the great tension in property law.
With her usual insight, Professor Carol M. Rose has characterized the tension between individual and
community resource claims as ownership anxiety. See generally Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property
Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601 (1998).
98. The California Supreme Court has a long history of tempering the strict enforcement of both
ground and surface rights through the use of physical solutions to balance equity, efficiency and the
settled expectations that water law seeks to generate, see Harrison C. Dunning, The "Physical
Solution" in Western Water Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 445, 458-64 (1986), but it has recently moved
away from this tradition, see City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 870 (Cal. 2000).

2000]

PRIOR APPROPRIATION

899

benefits. A cautionary tale from Aspen, Colorado makes the point.
During the dry summer of 1975, the president of an irrigation district in
then-not-as- chic Aspen instructed his ditch rider to construct a
makeshift dam to force all the water into the ditch's head gate. This was
done solely to demonstrate that senior irrigation rights were superior to
recently filed state instream flow rights on the Roaring Fork River.
Roaring Fork in fact dried up through Aspen for a day, but the next
night "[enraged citizens gathered sledgehammers and crow bars and . .
• smashed Berquist's [the ditch rider's] handiwork to pieces and freed
the water to go back into Roaring Fork." 99 The dam was not rebuilt.
More generally, state practice in both "soft" and "hard" appropriation
states seeks to avoid priority enforcement.
The protection of correlative can be found both in states that
substitute dams for water rights enforcement, and those that do not.
California is famous for solving water allocation problems by constructing a massive water infrastructure and allocating water by large
blocks. Colorado is often cited as the opposite case where hundreds of
water lawyers fight over small amounts on small streams, and the Colorado Supreme Court continues to refine prior appropriation law. But,
examples of priority avoidance can be found in Colorado. When a new
appropriation applies for a water permit or, in Colorado, a conditional
degree, an administrative agency or a court must determine if there is
water available for appropriation. There are two approaches in the West.
Texas and Nevada simply add up the amounts claimed in previous
permits and compare them to the estimate annual flow.1 00 This limits
new entrants. In contrast, Colorado takes a more realistic view of the
practice of water use and assumes that the claimed or paper entitlement
may not represent the amount of water actually put to beneficial use.
The decision has been limited in subsequent decisions, but it does
illustrate that courts will sometimes subordinate priority to sharing.101
99. Mark Harvey, The Politics of Water, ROARING FORK SUNDAY, June 20, 1999, at Al, A4. I am
indebted to Ramsey Knopf for sending me the newspaper.
100. See Lower Colorado River Auth. v. Texas Dep't of Water Res., 689 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex.
1984).
101. Pueblo West Metropolitan District v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District,
717 P.2d 955, 960 (Colo. 1986), holds that out-of-priority diversions will not be counted for purposes of
calculating consumable water that can be transferred, and Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners
Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46 (Colo. 1999), limits Southeastern Colorado Water ConservancyDistrict
v. Rich, 625 P.2d 977 (Colo. 1981), to changes in diversion point that (1) do not increase applicable
water duties, (2) were unopposed, and (3) where actual historic water use has been established.

900

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

B.

[VOL. 76:881

PRIORITY DOES NOT WORK FOR NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES

Priority does not work for nonrenewable water resources such as
ground water aquifers. These resources were initially allocated by a rule
of capture out of scientific ignorance. The rule of capture practically
bankrupted the oil and gas industry until it was replaced by correlative
rights schemes that allocate rights based on the relationship between
1 02
overlying parcels and the common oil and gas pool.

The story is the same for many western ground water basins, and
prior appropriation has not proved to be the effective conservation rule
that many hoped that it would be. Western states have not successfully
applied priority to ground water. Many western states continue to allocate ground water by separate rules. In the western states that apply the
prior appropriation system to ground water, priority has proved impossible to administer in practice for basins that are not directly hydrologically connected to surface systems. The problem is that a causal
connection between a victim senior well and a junior well is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to establish. 103 All wells contribute to mining
and it is difficult to insulate the causal connection between a well and the
relevant cone of depression.
For efficiency and fairness reasons, the ground water appropriative
right does not include a right to the maintenance of the pressure level at
the time the right was perfected. 104 The non-recognition of a "right to
lift" effectively converts ground water appropriations in pro rata sharing
rights along the lines of California's correlative rights rules. In fact,
most states have moved to an allocation rule that closes basins in
overdraft to new entrants 10 5 but allows all pumpers to pump without
restriction or imposes pro rata limitations to prevent mining. 106 The
important ground water using states, California, Nebraska, and Texas, do
102. See BRUCE KRAMER & PATRICK MARTIN, POOLING AND UNITIZATION § 5.01 (1991).
Technically, in all oil and gas producing states except Texas, compulsory unitization is a statutory
mechanism to allow the state to force minority common pool owners to join a unit defined and
administered by the minority interest holders.
103. Steven Clyde reports that in Utah, which formally applies prior appropriation to ground
water, "the State Engineer has been very reluctant to enforce priorities. He has adopted a gentle
persuasion approach to enforcement during drought cycles and encouraged all ground water users to
share the available resource and has coupled his request with a threat to start enforcing on the basis of
priorities." Interview with Steven Clyde; Clyde, Snow, Session, and Swenson; Salt Lake City, Utah
(Sept. 19, 1999).
104. See Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 513 P.2d 627, 636 (Idaho 1973).
105. See generally Doherty v. Oregon Water Res. Dir., 783 P.2d 519 (Or. 1989).
106. "Underground water basins require management that is different from the management of
surface streams and underground waters tributary to such streams." Fundingsland v. Colorado Ground
Water Comm'n, 468 P.2d 835, 839 (Colo. 1970); accord John C. Peck, Kansas Groundwater
Management Districts,29 KAN. L. REV. 51 (1980).

2000]

PRIOR APPROPRIATION

not subject ground water to prior appropriation, and California and
Texas provide minimal or no restrictions on pumping. Thus, states have
allowed de jure or de facto ground water mining and have not tried to
use the mild conservation bias inherent in prior appropriation.
The plight of a northern Colorado well owner to enforce a priority
illustrates the difference between ground and surface water rights
enforcement. 0 7 Mr. Goss owned a senior permitted well in a designated
ground water management district, and as well levels declined, he sought
to enforce his priority against a junior well owner. Under Colorado
ground water law, designated ground water is subsurface water that is
presumed to be not tributary to a surface stream. 108 Designated ground
water may be mined pursuant to appropriation permits. "In designated
ground water basins, conservation and reasonable depletion of the
aquifer are paired with economic development .
Unlike surface
water in Colorado, ground water is subject to administrative regulation,
but in a true Catch 22, both the state Ground Water Commission and the
local management district disclaimed jurisdiction. Mr. Goss eventually
obtained a writ of mandate against the local district to enforce his
priority. The Colorado Supreme Court per Justice Hobbs, who has been
effectively restating and clarifying Colorado water law in his opinions,
agreed that the local district had the power to enforce well priorities, but
it laid out a procedure and a substantive standard that will make
enforcement highly unlikely. The ground water user must first petition
the District for enforcement, and if it refuses, he is entitled to an
adjudicatory hearing. Unlike a surface appropriation, the senior well
owner is not automatically entitled to enforcement if he proves a decline
in his water table because designated ground water is mined ground
water; thus, the risk of pressure declines or reasonable injury is an
inherent component of the right. The well owner must prove unreasonable injury. Put differently, Wiel's theory of reasonable versus
unreasonable priorities has been applied to ground water.
*..."109

C.

STRICT ENFORCEMENT IS OFTEN INEFFICIENT

The strict enforcement of priorities tends to lead to inefficient use
practices. The cushion of a senior right combined with the "use it or
lose it" rules, abandonment and forfeiture, create powerful incentives to
use the' maximum entitlement and to forego investments in water
conservation infrastructure. Larry MacDonnell's recent study of two
107. See generally Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Goss, 993 P.2d
1177 (Colo. 2000).
108. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(6) (2000).
109. Goss, 993 P.2d at 1189.
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adjacent irrigation districts in the Yakima Valley of Washington State is
instructive. One district, the Sunnyside Division of the Yakima Project,
has senior rights that go back to pre-Reclamation Act diversions, and
these rights are primarily non-proratable. The other, the Roza Irrigation
District, has a contract with the Bureau of Reclamation which is
proratable. The Roza Division receives much less water compared to the
Sunnyside Division in dry years and "has invested heavily in improvements in its water delivery and use systems in order to take best
advantage of the water supply available to it." 10
D.

STRICT ENFORCEMENT MAY BE UNFAIR

There is increasing and disturbing evidence that priorities and other
aspects of western water law are enforced unequally against politically
marginal users. Indian tribes have trouble enough claiming "wet"
Indian reserved water rights, but they also can face curtailment risks for
their quantified rights above those faced by non-Indian irrigators as the
holders of the original reserved right found out in 1981. The Fort
Belknap Reservation in extreme northeastern Montana is the beneficiary
of the first Indian reserved water right with a May 1, 1888 priority.'"1
The Tribe has both a direct flow right in the Milk River, a tributary of
the Missouri, and a 1/7 interest in a subsequently constructed reservoir.
In 1985, there was a severe drought in the state, and after the Tribe used
its 1/7 reservoir right, the Bureau of Indian Affairs acceded to a Bureau
of Reclamation request to close the Reservation's head gate due both to
insufficient water and the threat of water pirates. The Tribe immediately
filed suit, but August rains allowed the Bureau to make temporary
reservoir releases to benefit the Tribe.112
Instream flow facilitators may also find the rules of prior appropriation apply only to them. In Oregon, the Oregon Water Trust has been
purchasing senior agricultural water rights, and it reports that it is subject
to much more rigorous change of use proceedings compared to
non-instream use transfers, as a result of opposition to instream flow
protection by the Oregon Farm Bureau and Cattleman's Association."1 3
In short, there is full prior appropriation for fish, but not for irrigation.
In the Pacific Northwest, there may be substantial deliveries of Reclamation Project water to non-project beneficiaries to the detriment of endangered salmon. In 1994, allegations of water spreading, the delivery of
110. LAWRENCE J. M AcDoNNELL, FROM R ECLAMATION TO S USTAINABILITY:
AND THE ENvIRONMENT IN THE AMERICAN WEST 201 (1999).

WATER, AGRICULTURE,

111. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1908).
112. See CHARLES J. MEYERS Er AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 779 (1987).

113. Interview with Janet Neuman, Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School (June 19, 2000).
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water to ineligible or non-project beneficiaries surfaced, and the Clinton
Administration formed a task force to eliminate the practice and recover
past illegal benefits. In 1995, the Task Force was terminated and the
problem was turned back to the regions, which is a prescription for
inaction. 1 4 In the meantime, priority enforcement will seldom be an
issue for the beneficiary irrigators.
E. MUNICIPALITIES WILL NOT BE DRIED UP
The strict enforcement of priorities is not likely to be applied
against municipalities. Equity and efficiency aside, it is unlikely that it
will be politically acceptable to ration water to large cities based on the
strict enforcement priorities. In addition, cities have power, the financial
capability and the legal authority to acquire large reserves to buffer them
against drought of water. Municipal appropriations are subject to lighter
anti-speculative control compared to other appropriations. The "progressive growth" doctrine allows a city to perfect a water right based on
115
its anticipated need for the water.
The doctrine is an exception to the principle that water rights cannot
be held for speculative purposes. The anti-speculation principle seeks to
ensure that water rights are as widely distributed as the available supply
will permit among those who have the present ability to put water to
beneficial use. 116 Cities enjoy an even larger exemption from the
anti-speculation principle under the growing cities doctrine. Like the
progressive growth doctrine, this doctrine also allows cities to perfect a
water right to the amount of water that they will need to meet reasonably
anticipated future growth.117
Cities also have a much greater capacity to adjust to short and long
term droughts through rationing and demand management. 118 Municipal capacity is illustrated by the growing number of western cities that
114. Interview with Reed Benson, Oregon Water Watch (July 21, 2000).
115. See, e.g., St. Onge v. Blakeley, 245 P. 532, 539 (Mont. 1926); State ex rel. State Eng'r v.
Crider, 431 P.2d 45, 48-49 (N.M. 1967).
116. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d
566, 568 (Colo. 1979).
117. See, e.g., Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 29-30 (Colo. 1996); City and County
of Denver v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d 992 (Colo. 1954); City and County
of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836 (Colo. 1939); Reynolds v. City of Roswell, 654 P.2d 537 (N.M.
1982); Department of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 957 P.2d 1241, 1257-58 (Wash. 1998) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting); Tarlock & Van de Wetering, supra note 85; Janis E. Carpenter, Water for Growing
Communities: Refining Tradition in the PacificNorthwest, 27 ENvL. L. 127 (1997); Dennis J. Herman,
Note, Sometimes There is Nothing Left to Give: The Justificationfor Denying Water Service to New
Customers to Control Growth, 44 STAN. L. REV. 429 (1992).
118. Steven Clyde reports that in the last major drought in Utah, which occurred in the early
1990s, some agricultural users were curtailed, but "no domestic water rights were cut off," although
cities were forced to ration and limit landscape irrigation. Interview with Steven Clyde; Clyde, Snow,
Sessions, and Swenson; Salt Lake City, Utah (Sept. 19, 1999).
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have, of necessity, begun to add water supply elements to their growth
management plans. For example, San Diego, California faces the double
problem of limited natural surface and ground water supplies and a low
priority Colorado River entitlement. The city has linked water supply
and growth as part of its ongoing growth management program and has
outlined a five-part strategy. In the future, San Diego will depend primarily on a combination of (1) more efficient use of existing supplies,
(2) demand management, (3) the reallocation of existing supplies
through water marketing, (4) more limited new storage and distribution
facilities, and (5) greater conjunctive ground and surface water use. 119
The most extreme example of water planning and conservation as a
strategy for unlimited growth accommodation is Arizona's 100-year
assured water supply policy. The state's Groundwater Management Act
imposes a duty on all new developments, and thus on their municipal
suppliers, to establish that there will be "a sufficient supply of water
which will be physically available to satisfy the applicant's 100-year
projected water demand."1 20 The rules are structured to eliminate
reliance on continued ground water mining to establish an assured water
supply. Initially, the rules set off a scramble to acquire agricultural water
rights in remote counties, but more recently, municipal suppliers will
have to pay the high Central Arizona Project (CAP) rates for Arizona's
underused Colorado River entitlement.121 As Phoenix and Tucson have
used more surface water, municipal water use has started to decline in
part because of a wetter than average cycle, ground water conservation,
and increased reliance on gray water for turf irrigation. 122 Other cities
are slouching toward marginal cost pricing to limit water use. El Paso,
Texas estimates the recoverable ground water in its share of the Hueco
Bolson, which it fought so hard to expand into New Mexico, will be
depleted by 2025, but the cities El Paso and Ciudad Juarez will grow to 5
million people. 12 3 El Paso has implemented an aggressive conservation
strategy including a seasonable excess use rate structure. This inverted
rate structure charges users a rate based on the customer's percentage
use above their average winter consumption.1 24 All of these strategies
119. See San Diego County Smart Growth Coalition Water Resources Availability Study Team,
http://co.san-diego.ca.us.sgc/water/recommendations.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2001).
120. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R12-15-703(B).
121. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS INTHE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (1992).
122. See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Long, 773 P.2d 988 (Ariz. 1989).
123. See Octavio E. Chvez, Mining of Internationally Shared Aquifers: The El Paso-Judrez
Case, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 237, 248 (2000).
124. Edmund G. Archuleta & Anai J. Padilla, Water Conservation Pricingat the El Paso Water
Utilities (visited Sept. 27, 2000) <http://twri.tamu.edu/twriconf/w4tx98/papers/padilla.html>.
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will buffer cities in times of shortages and minimize the possibility of
priority enforcement.
F.

THE LARGER THE ALLOCATION, THE MORE DIFFICULT IT IS TO
ENFORCE PRIORITIES

Prior appropriation applies to large as well as small amounts of
water, but the larger the block, the less important priorities will be. There
are many reasons for this assertion. First, large blocks of water come
from carry-over storage reservoirs, and it takes a prolonged drought to
produce shortages. Second, larger block holders will have the political
clout to resist enforcement. California's ability to take surplus water
from the Colorado River illustrates this reason in action. Third, the larger the block, the easier it is for entitlement holders to absorb
proportionate cut backs.
The low risk of priority enforcement among large block holders is
nicely illustrated by California's long success in diverting the Colorado
River in excess of its priority. In 1922, the seven Colorado River basin
states allocated the Colorado River between the two basins. Each basin
was given 7.5 million acre feet, and the lower basins, Arizona, California
and Nevada were given an additional 1 million acre feet. In 1928,
Congress passed the Boulder Canyon Project Act to authorize the
construction of Hoover dam. 12 5 The three lower basin states could not
agree on an allocation because California had already put over 5 million
acre feet to use. The Act resolved the conflict by allocating 4.4 million
126
acre feet to California, 2.8 million to Arizona and 300,000 to Nevada.
Three years later, the major California water users agreed to an internal
priority schedule which applied to the almost 5.4 million acre feet of
water the state was diverting.127 To complicate matters, under the seven
party agreement, the four major irrigation districts adjacent to the River
enjoy a superior priority over the Metropolitan Water District, which
serves much of urban Southern California. Subsequently, Arizona v.
California12 8 construed the Act as a Congressional apportionment of the
lower basin flow among the three basin states and therefore confirmed
the 1928 Congressional appointment, which in effect subordinated
California's customary use priority to Arizona's equities.
125. See Pub. L. No. 70-642, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617u
(1994)). For a history of the apportionment of the Colorado, see Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado
River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966).
126. See 43 U.S.C. § 617c(a) (1994).
127. See NORRIS HUNDLEY, WATER IN THE WEST: THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE
POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST 287 (1975).
128. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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The law and politics of the Colorado River have long been primarily
driven by efforts of all the basin states, except of course, California, to
prevent California's actual use from ripening into a permanent right.
29
California has consistently diverted about 5.2 million acre feet a year.1
Arizona technically succeeded in curtailing this use when the Supreme
Court ruled that the Boulder Canyon Project Act limited California to
4.4 million acre feet and that the Secretary of Interior had the power to
apportion both surpluses and shortages. 130 California, however, has long
been able to ignore Arizona's entitlements for legal and hydrologic
reasons. First, Arizona had to convince the federal government to
authorize the Central Arizona Project to put her share of the River to use
in the populous interior. California was able to force Arizona to
subordinate her CAP priority to California's as the price for Congressional authorization of the project. Second, the long delay in construction and the CAP transformed it from an agricultural to an urban
supply project, and allowed California to continue to use its 700,000 acre
feet of surplus water throughout the twentieth century as central Arizona
and Las Vegas grew into major urban agglomeration. 13 1
California's excess diversions may be slowly ending. Exponential
urban growth in Arizona and Nevada, along with Indian entitlements and
compliance with the Endangered Species Act, raise the very real possibility that California must now live with its 4.4 allocation.1 32 The three
lower basin states and the Department of Interior agreed to a curtailment
plan which would never pass muster as a substance abuse treatment program.133 There will be no cold turkey or paid withdrawal for California.
California will have at least fifteen years to reduce its diversions from 5.2
to 4.4 million acre feet.
G.

INTER-REGIONAL POLITICS CAN TRUMP PRIORITY

A priority is ineffective unless water can be put to beneficial use,
and inter-regional politics may prevent this. This limitation is illustrated
129. See SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 701-02.
130. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565, 580 (1963).
131. California had an additional advantage of being able to borrow in dry years and pay back in
a wet year, but in wet years when water was spilled because of a surplus, the payback obligation was
in effect canceled. Interview with Joe Sax, House-Hurd Professor of Law, University of CaliforniaBerkely (Sept. 1, 1999).
132. See SAX ET AL., supra note 4, at 701.
133. California and Las Vegas will still be able to tap into Arizona's surplus, if any. The
Department of Interior has issued a final rule which allows authorized state entities in the three lower
Colorado River Basin states to store unused Colorado River entitlements water in off-stream reservoirs
and aquifers. After unused surplus entitlements have been offered to entitlement holders in the storing
states, the Secretary of Interior may release the water pursuant a voluntary Interstate Release
Agreement for use in another Lower Basin state. See 43 C.F.R. pt. 414 (1999) (explained at 64 Fed.
Reg. 58,986 (Nov. 1, 1999)).
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by the story of the lower Missouri Basin's political triumph over the
upper. In brief, in 1944 Congress authorized the Pick-Sloan Plan, an
amalgam of Corps of Engineer flood control and Bureau of Reclamation
irrigation projects. 134 Five mainstream Missouri River dams were added
to the Fort Peck dam in Montana to turn the river into a series of lakes
and a narrow channel below Gavin's Point dam.13 5 The grand compromise of Pick-Sloan was that the Upper Basin states and Indian tribes
would give up a great deal of land for the mainstream reservoirs which
would provide immediate flood control and navigation enhancement for
the lower basin in return for future irrigation projects.1 36 The PickSloan dams were built, but Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota
never received the promised irrigation projects for a variety of reasons,
including poor drainage and the end of federal subsidization of
irrigation.1 3 7 As the price for the dams, Senators O'Mahoney of
Wyoming and Millikin of Colorado succeeded in enacting an
amendment which gives irrigation and other upstream consumptive uses
priority over navigation. 138 The O'Mahoney-Millikin Amendment is of
no use to the Upper Basin states. Today, the issue is whether the
reservoirs should be re-operated to protect endangered species and
recreation interests, and the Upper Basin states are trying to induce the
river master, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to expand its mission
from flood control and navigation enhancement to include ecosystem
management and recreation enhancement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The net result of the large and small reservoirs and distribution
systems that vein the West is that the risks of variable stream flows and
the actual enforcement of priorities have been masked by this infrastructure and the importance of priority diminished. Carry-over storage
reduced, rather than eliminated, the inherent risks and therefore, created
the conditions for the expectation of a dependable supply to become the
real rule of water allocation. Water rights are more accurately characterized as a risk allocation regime among a wide range of claimants.1 3 9
134. See JOHN R. FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA: A LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
PICK-SLOAN MissouRi BASIN PROGRAM, at xii (1993).

135. See id. at 61-63.
136. See THORSON, supra note 68, at 82-83.
137. See THORSON, supranote 68, at 80.
138. See John P. Guhin, The Law Of The Missouri, 30 S.D. L. REV. 346, 411 (1985).
139. This analysis borrows from some of premises of "green Property" theory such as the need
to recognize that entitlements are part of a larger landscape, the role of public participation in defining
the expectations of property right holders, see Terry W. Frazier, The Green Alternative to Classical
Liberal PropertyTheory, 20 VT. L. REV. 299, 357-63 (1995), and the insight that property rights have
always been redefined as societies have changed, see Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water
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Property rights, in contrast to contracts, are not conventionally defined as
risk allocation mechanisms because the law of property seeks to
eliminate the risk that there will be an interference with complete enjoyment, such as an unconsented entry. Courts often announce that the
function of water law is to create certain, exclusive property rights, but
the real function should be to protect the expectation of the water users
to a sufficient supply to support the underlying beneficial use. Naturally, there will be considerable resistance to this idea, as a 2000 California
Supreme Court opinion illustrates, which underscores the idea that
courts, legislatures, and users must be persuaded that priority departures
are both fair and efficient.
In a recent ground water adjudication, the California Supreme Court
had an opportunity to implement an expectation-based allocation
scheme but refused to do so when the scheme conflicted with priority
rights.14 0 The opinion illustrates the likely judicial resistance to priority
modification. In brief, the Mojave River basin in southern California is
a severely over-drafted ground water basin. After a lengthy negotiation,
the trial court imposed a physical solution, much like compulsory unitization is imposed on holdout oil and gas pumpers, after over 80 percent of
the basin water users agreed to it. Under the solution, pumpers were
assigned a free production allowance; pumping in excess of the
allowance was subject to a charge dedicated to the purchase of
replacement water. California ground water law divides rights among
overlying, appropriative, and prescriptive rights. 141 Overlying owners
have priority over non-overlying users; non-overlying users may obtain
appropriative rights only if there is surplus water-water in excess of safe
yield. Non-overlying pumpers can also obtain prescriptive rights. These
rules are difficult to administer, in large part because most ground water
basins are overdrafted, and in the past the courts have preferred
basin-wide solutions that equitably distribute the burdens of limiting
ground water use to safe yield among all basin users to the strict
42
declaration and adjudication of rights.I
The Mojave settlement pitted large municipal users against alfalfa
and dairy farmers who decided to stand on their "prior" overlying
Resources Control Board, 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256 (1990); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the
Economy of Nature: UnderstandingLucas v. South Carolina CoastalCouncil, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433,
1447-48 (1993). However, I ultimately make a more traditional argument that the voluntary or
involuntary adjustment of the risks inherent in water rights to modify (but not eliminate) historic water
delivery patterns is a limitation inherent in a water right title and thus constitutional under the
restrictive test of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). See Fred P.
Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247
(1996), for a creative application of this argument to wetland regulation.
140. See City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 869 (Cal. 2000).
141. See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1307, 1318 (Cal. 1975).
142. See City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 32 (Cal. 1949).
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rights, and the California Supreme Court held that trial courts lack the
authority to, based on the doctrine of equitable apportionment, impose a
physical solution on holdout overlying pumpers which alters their
preexisting rights. "[I]t is clear that a trial court may impose a physical
solution to achieve a practical allocation of water to competing interests,
[but] the solution's general purpose cannot simply ignore the priority
rights of the parties asserting them."1 4 3 The court's reluctance to impose the solution on the holdout farmers appears to be based on the
conclusion that it was inequitable to deprive the farmers of their prior
water rights because the payment of replacement waters would be a
144
hardship to them.
City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency145 illustrates the force of
the idea of priority, but courts must eventually recognize that appropriate rights have never been risk free. Two consequences follow from the
explicit characterization of appropriate water rights as risk allocation
mechanisms. First, water users must simultaneously plan for the reductions dictated by the strict enforcement of priorities and for alternative
reduction scenarios. In general, priorities are likely to be enforced in the
short but not the long run. A serious shortage from a "natural" or
"global climate change-induced" drought will strain existing allocation
schemes and induce different adaptation patterns. Second, as the West
tries to incorporate ecosystem restoration into existing consumptive
entitlements, new, often ad hoc risk sharing schemes will emerge. These
will not displace prior appropriation; they will be overlaid on existing
entitlements. But, these schemes will alter the risks of existing entitlement holders. The focus should shift, as Samuel Wiel predicted long
143. City of Barstow, 5 P.3d at 869. For a prescient defense of the Supreme Court's holding, see
Rebecca Sugerman, The Mojave Basin Physical Solution: It's a Good Idea, But Is It Good Law?, 6
HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 307 (2000).
144. Professor Brian Grey of Hastings College of Law attributes the Supreme Court's protection
of holdouts to the trial court; failure to determine if the holdout's use was in fact a reasonable,
beneficial one. Interview with Brian Grey, Professor, Hastings College of Law (Sept. 22, 2000). City
of Barstow takes California water law in a new direction, priority enforcement, and it is a substantial
break with the Court's long tradition of trying to accommodate water law to changing conditions
without undue disruption of beneficial uses. The opinion is not unsupported by precedent, but it has
two primary flaws. First, those who agreed to the settlement are estopped to assert "better" water
rights once they agree to a physical solution, so the incentives for basin-wide agreements are
substantially undermined. Second, the overlying owner's ground water rights lack the very attributive
of priority-certainty that justifies strict enforcement. Prior overlying ground water rights in California
are highly uncertain. They are correlative; no fixed allocation formula exists, and they are subject to
a Constitutional provision that limits all water rights to reasonable and beneficial uses. In short, the
expectations of a fixed quantity of water are much less than a surface appropriator with a fixed
priority date. City of Barstow will not be the last word on priority or physical solutions in the state, but it
substantially increases the burden on those trying to devise and implement innovative solutions that
promote both equity and efficiency.
145. 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000).
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ago, to the reasonable rather than formal expectations of the right
holder. 146
146. See WIEL, supra note 1, § 310, at 329.

